Reciprocity, symmetry breakers, and semantic stop signs

I find the debate over the existence of a god intrinsically interesting. Of the many arguments that exist, I find one argument in favor of the existence of a god to be quite clever: Alvin Plantinga’s modal ontological argument. I won’t go too deeply into the finer details of that argument here, but in a very simplified and abbreviated form it can be described as follows. After providing a definition of ‘god’, the argument simply begins with the peculiar premise that the existence of such a being is at least possible. From there, it uses modal logic to go through a series of steps to reach the conclusion that the existence of such a being is necessarily true. The argument is logically valid, and everything follows deductively from the rather modest assumption that the existence of God is merely possible. This means that if you want to deny the conclusion of the argument, it becomes your duty to dispute that first and only premise, and make a positive argument that the existence of God is impossible.

One of the biggest counterarguments to the modal ontological argument is to point out that there is a symmetrical argument that can be constructed to reach the opposite conclusion. That is, you can also start with the rather modest premise that it is simply possible that no god exists, and using the same logically valid steps, arrive at the conclusion that the non-existence of a god is necessarily true. To solve this problem one would have to propose some kind of symmetry breaker between these two arguments, so that we have a non-arbitrary reason to prefer one over the other. Philosophers and theologians have proposed a number of different symmetry breakers over the years – you can see a compilation and evaluation of them in this recently released article, if you’re interested.

Why am I bringing all this up? Well, recently I have Posted about how I think libertarianism and classical liberalism are more focused on reciprocity than other political philosophies. I argued that Thomas Christiano’s argument for the authority of democracy, based on the obligation to appropriately respect the judgment of one’s fellow citizens, fails because the obligation he invokes (if it existed, which is far from clear!) is reciprocal in nature. As I put it there:

I also argued that Yoram Hazony’s concerns about free trade undermining mutual loyalty among a country’s citizens fall flat because of the same issue:

Like the modal ontological argument, both situations require a symmetry breaker before they can reach the conclusions their proponents seek. And that’s what I think classical liberal and libertarian thought brings to light by focusing on the reciprocal nature of these situations. Invoking symmetry is not a semantic stop sign, designed to end conversations. It is an invitation to continue a conversation by pointing out that there is another factor that requires attention.

In the comments section of my previous post also commenter Dylan raised the issue of symmetry breakers regarding externalities. Dylan points out that people’s moral intuitions about a situation serve as a symmetry breaker in many cases. I brought up Ronald Coase’s insight on the reciprocal nature of externalities in my post – and Dylan described how widely held beliefs about certain cases will break the symmetrical nature of the situation for many people. As he put it:

I think this accurately describes how the vast majority of people would react to this situation. Saying to someone, “Why don’t you just pay that factory to install scrubbers if you’re so angry about their smoke and soot falling into your yard,” just feels wrong. Most people react strongly along the lines of, “They shouldn’t be blowing soot over my house in the first place – why would they do that? I must pay them to make it stop?”

I think that moral considerations are a source of symmetry breakers in many cases. To use a simple example, my wish for my house not to burn down interferes with Pyro Pete’s wish to burn down houses. Technically, we impose on each other in a reciprocal, symmetrical manner. But I don’t think it’s much of a moral mystery to figure out what a symmetry breaker is in these circumstances. Arson is wrong, therefore my imposition of Pyro Pete’s wishes is morally justified in a way that breaks symmetry.

Sometimes in situations where the moral obligation is not clear (or does not apply), other sources of symmetry breakers exist. Sometimes social conventions and norms can serve as symmetry breakers. Or in the legal system, a benchmark that is sometimes used is the principle of ‘least cost avoider’. Under this standard, if two parties impose equally on each other (in a way that does not clearly violate an existing law or moral obligation), the responsibility to improve the situation is given to the party with the lowest cost to do so. If changing the situation is a big burden for me but only a minor inconvenience for you, then that serves as the symmetry breaker in these cases.

The libertarian and classical liberal focus on reciprocity and symmetry does not arise from a desire to argue that all laws or interventions are always unjustified on the grounds that every situation is symmetrical. If that were the case, libertarians would argue that a law banning Pyro Pete from burying my house is unjustified – but I have yet to encounter a libertarian who favors arson! But libertarians and classical liberals are right to point out that the issue of reciprocity and symmetry exists and that these are important issues that deserve investigation. Symmetry is not an insurmountable obstacle, but ignoring the problem is not justified. To the extent that libertarians and classical liberals continue to address this issue, they are doing a service to public debate.